Hi David, thank you for this comment.

First, I'm fully with you on Israel being held to vastly different standards than other countries. It takes far more care to prevent civilian deaths than the U.S. military. And it's not even a fair comparison to Russia or any other genocidal country because the aims of the latter are genocidal, whereas if Israel could protect itself without killing civilians, it would. There is so much to say here, and I'm reading a book called Israelophobia that goes into the history of how this came about.

Second, good point: my article does not give deterrence the attention it deserves; I'm not even sure I mention the word at all. As you point out, Israel needs to restore deterrence not only for Hamas, which is its weakest adversary, but for Hezbollah, Iran and much more potent adversaries.

You also mention a really important question, that I'll put in my own words: what standard should we use for assessing how sufficiently Israel's actions provide deterrence? You make the case for a high standard—that it's better to err on the side of being too brutal. I don't know if I share that view, but it makes sense to me.

A related issue I would add: what actually deters Hezbollah and Iran? What truly makes a difference? Let me offer some numbers that aren't real numbers but just for sake of argument: If Israel destroys 10,000 buildings instead of 3,000 buildings, does this increase deterrence? Does being less careful in its bombings (so that more civilians die) increase deterrence? The answer may well be yes; the point is that I don't know and am curious how Israel assesses this, if it does it at all.

What matters most to the other adversaries? I would assume that if Israel wants to deter those groups, assassinating the top Gaza leadership of Hamas would be very effective (and assassinating its very top leadership, who aren't even in Gaza), would be more effective albeit difficult and risky to do). If this is the case, how best to do that? One could argue that by making such an obvious approach—by telegraphing its moves—Israel actually reduces the odds of succeeding in those assassinations. And that through more of a careful and sly approach, it would be more successful. I haven't read a lot on this, but it seems to be an important question.