Seven ideas about Israel/Gaza that can’t survive reality
In heated conversations about the war in Israel and Gaza, nuance and complexity get the short shrift. My first two articles, How best to restore Israel’s security and save innocent lives? and On Israel and the war, I am four Jews, represented modest efforts to counterbalance this trend. Both took seriously the notion that there are multiple valid perspectives on the war. The first article proposed a strategy for Israel that differed vastly from its current one, one coupling counterterrorism with targeted assassinations and built on the meshing of perspectives; obviously, Israel didn’t follow my advice. The second article described a wrestling arena within me where these multiple views competed for my attention.
Yet there is more to this story than nuance and complexity. Many people, including our friends and colleagues, are advocating for ideas that can’t survive reality — or at least represent ungrounded assessments of the situation.
Here are seven such ideas. The first five appear on the lips of Israel’s fiercest critics. The final two are associated with Israel’s supporters.
1. Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.
For the moment, I’ll leave aside the impact of using the term “genocide” and how this echoes a long history of portraying Jews as murderers. Instead, let’s look at whether or not this assessment is well grounded.
Ironically, most people calling Israel’s actions genocide don’t offer evidence. They treat this statement not as an assessment requiring grounding but instead as an assertion of fact. The confusion between assessments and assertions infects all of us — and indeed has been a big focus of my leadership development work over the past 25 years. In this case, however, it serves a specific purpose: spreading propaganda rooted in ideological fervor.
Genocide is a claim about both actions and intentions. It’s not enough to be killing people and destroying a way of life. According to the UN Genocide Convention of 1948, you need to be doing this in order “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.” Here’s what this means: your actions cannot be in self-defense. Your actions cannot be a just war fought with indiscrimate attacks or insufficient regard for civilians; those would be war crimes.
A genocidal act is one where your goal is to destroy all or part of a group. Is this Israel’s goal?
Not in my assessment. In order to call this genocide, you would need to hide or ignore the voluminous evidence that Israel is fighting the war in self-defense and for the sake of deterrence.
You would also need to explain why Israel hasn’t killed more Palestinians — why the number of dead is 20,000 (of which each civilian death is tragic) rather than 200,000 or a million.
This sounds cold, but stick with me, and I think you’ll understand what I mean.
In the first six days of the war, Israel dropped 6,000 bombs and killed 2,000 people. 6,000 is an enormous number of bombs. The 2,000 people included many children and other innocent civilians, people who did nothing to deserve this. However, other than this being the tragic nature of war, it also calls for a bit of simple math. 6,000 is a lot of bombs, and 2,000 is a lot of people. But what happens when you look at these numbers together?
It took 6,000 bombs to kill 2,000 people. That’s three bombs for every person. By a military with highly trained pilots and the latest technology in precision bombing. If Israel’s goal were genocide, would it have taken three bombs to kill each person? And wouldn’t it have killed a million Palestinians in Gaza by now, not 20,000? I asked this to three extremely smart people in the “this-is-genocide” camp. None of them provided a strong answer.
To believe that Israel is genocidal, one must believe that either (a) its military is incompetent at murdering people or (b) its goal is to murder people slowly. Explanation a is implausible. Explanation b is at least slightly possible — look at the disease and starvation — but why would Israel do this? And does this really match Israel’s motivations after October 7 more than self-defense and deterrence? How do you know?
A better interpretation of Israel’s intentions in this war is that it aims to “take out Hamas” and restore deterrence by destroying missile launchers and command centers, killing terrorists, and leveling enough buildings that its ground invasion stands a greater chance of success. I’m not justifying these actions morally or strategically. I argued for a very different approach.
But this, in my assessment and based on the evidence I’ve seen, is not genocide.
2. The October 7 massacre by Hamas was about ending the occupation and making a two-state solution possible.
If you know anything about Hamas, this statement is just plain foolish. Hamas has no interest in a two-state solution and no particular interest in ending the occupation. It is a death cult that aims for the destruction of the state of Israel and the murder or expulsion of Jews.
The October 7 massacre is the one act in this war that does warrant the label of genocidal. Murdering Israelis, particularly Jews, was the point. And it was one that Hamas terrorists took horrific delight in carrying out. As reported by people who’ve watched videos of the massacre, we might say that the perpetrators of the massacre were in a mood of exhuberance. Chilling, to be sure, but worth seeing with clear eyes.
No, October 7 wasn’t about any intention that you or I would call noble, humane, or legitimate. And, as I’ll describe below, it most certainly hasn’t increased Israeli’s willingness to exit the West Bank and therefore allow the creation of a Palestinian state.
3. Israel is a white colonialist power
This is another example of propaganda that is as weakly grounded as it is persistent.
The word “white” represents an attempt to export American racial language — itself scientifically problematic and politically dangerous — into a completely different part of the world. Why export a product that is shoddy to begin with? There’s much to say here, but I’ve already made such arguments elsewhere, as in my case that deracializing people is essential to combating racism and my exploration of healthy and unhealthy DEI.
So let me me break this down into two claims and offer brief responses to each.
Idea: Israel is white European country that oppresses brown Palestinians
Reality: More than half of Israeli Jews come from the Middle East or northern Africa. They have brown skin of various hues and are known as Mizrahim. The reason they live in Israel is that life had become intolerable and unsafe in the Arab or Persian countries where their families had lived for generations. These Israelis grew up under illiberal values. They never experienced the Enlightenment. Due to this combination of influences, they are among the most forceful proponents of hard-right policies that harm Palestinians. Using the language of the drama triangle, they are an example of victims who have become persecutors. And, it’s worth repeating, they have a lot more melanin in their skin than Israel’s largely Ashkenazi founders. If there is such a thing as a “white person,” they aren’t it.
Idea: Israel was a European colony made possible by European imperialism
Reality: First, Jews were indigenous to the land and occupied it continuously, in large or small numbers, for over two millennia. You can’t colonize a place you are from. Second, colonies require mother countries, and Jews had none, certainly not Great Britian. Britain prevented Jews from immigrating to Palestine from Holocaust Europe. Despite its war efforts, Britain was, one might argue, partially complicit in that genocide. At the very least, it blocked nation-building. Third, Israel was born through battles against a colonial power. Members of the Yishuv waged insurrectionist warfare against the British for years. They wanted freedom from British rule. Finally, unlike classic colonists, few early Zionists wanted to displace Arabs. They committed a different sin: ignoring Arabs and the conflict inherent in living side by side. This may have been foolish, but it wasn’t an act of colonialism. In sum, Israel could be fairly described as anti-colonial or post-colonial, but not colonial.
4. There is an easy way for Israel to stop the bloodshed: end the occupation.
If only this were easy.
Most Israelis would happily end the occupation of the West Bank today if they could do so without creating grave threats to their security. (And if they could end the threat of violence from the West Bank and Gaza, they would demand the withdrawal of settlers from the West Bank; that’s how much Israelis value security). Like all occupations, this one is profoundly immoral, costly to maintain, and devastating to the morale of soldiers stationed there. From a diplomatic and public relations perspective, it is an unqualified disaster.
Why hasn’t Israel ended the occupation of the West Bank? Because, it assesses, the costs of withdrawal exceed the costs of maintaining the status quo. In particular, an exit from the West Bank would create an immediate and real threat to Israeli security.
Proponents of withdrawal rarely imagine practically what happens a week, a month, or a year afterwards. Or they convince themselves that the people occupying the West Bank simply want to be left alone, will be satisfied with a state in the West Bank and Gaza, and will elect only peaceful leaders committed to mutual security with Israel.
Sadly and tragically, none of these assumptions can survive reality.
As Einat Wilf describes in The War of Return, most Palestinians are emotionally and politically devoted to returning to pre-1967 Israel (a term for the land over which Israel was sovereign prior to the Six Day War of 1967). Palestinians have long viewed Zionism as “an outrageous injustice,” see themselves as refugees who have a “right to return” to their great-great grandparents’ former homes in cities like Jaffa and Haifa, and long to reverse painful and humiliating war defeats. This dedication to restoring dignity by returning en masse to pre-1967 Israel is the 500 pound elephant in the room of peace negotiations, never discussed, always deferred, yet central to the repeated failures to partition the land into two states. Palestinians insist on it, and Israelis will never allow it because doing so would eliminate the Jewish majority and therefore destroy the country’s very reason for being.
As importantly, the Palestinian leadership that emerged in the West Bank after withdrawal would very likely be hostile to Israel. There’s no way to predict the future, but Israelis know that when they unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in 2005, they didn’t get peace. They got Hamas. They got missiles, underground tunnels, and, eventually, October 7. Hamas is deeply popular in the West Bank, much more than the Palestinian Authority and even more so after October 7.
So, ending the occupation seems likely to result in Hamas taking power in another region, but this one vastly larger and with hilltops overlooking Israeli population centers and Ben Gurion Airport.
Now, things could be different if enough Palestinians let go of their dreams of return and finally declared the war of 1948 to be over. Things could be different if moderate Palestinian voices came to power, earned the legitimacy and respect of the people, and sidelined Hamas and other extremists. And, yes, things could be different if Israel elevated its own moderates, sidelined its own extremists, and withdrew all settlements that interfered with a contiguous Palestinian state and many others that don’t yet require Israeli military presence for security.
But this future is quite some time away.
In the meantime, no, ending the occupation isn’t an easy way out of this terrible conflict.
5. Israel is committing war crimes. Ceasefire now.
I’m opposed to war crimes. If evidence shows that Israel has committed—is committing — war crimes as part of its response to October 7, then it should stop committing those crimes. If these crimes involve indiscriminate bombings — an assessment made by evaluating the how and why of individual bombs — then Israel should become more discriminate. This is morally necessary and diplomatically smart.
But the solution to war crimes isn’t stopping the war. It’s ending the crimes. In February 1945, the United States and England arguably committed a war crime by carpet bombing Dresden, Germany. Should the Allies therefore have pulled out of the war? The question answers itself.
If Israel has committed war crimes, it should end the crimes, not stop the war.
Now, if Hamas were willing to hold up its end of a ceasefire, that’s a different story. This would mean releasing all kidnapped hostages, handing over perpetrators of the October 7 massacre, and making a full surrender and disarmament. How many people calling for a ceasefire are including this in their demands? Maybe its time to start.
6. Israel didn’t start this war. Hamas did.
Yes, Hamas initiated the war through its horrific slaughter of over 1,200 people, mostly Israeli Jews, on October 7. Yes, Israel had a right and duty to defend itself militarily by going to war. But Hamas did not force Israel to fight this war, by which I mean the specific approach Israel took to defending itself.
Israel had to respond militarily, but there is no iron law of military strategy or morality that forced Israel to initiate massive bombings of Gaza, instigate a complete siege, and launch a full ground invasion. Nor is there a communications principle that compelled Israel’s leaders to make incendiary comments in front of the camera (e.g. Defense Minister Gallant’s infamous initial justification for the siege) yet be largely opaque about what it was trying to accomplish and why.
Indeed, what frustrated me the most in the days after October 7 was Israel’s failure to use that unique moment in which it held the world’s sympathy to explain to everyone why Hamas exists, how Hamas operates, and the impossible choices this left Israel. Before taking any military action, Israel could have devoted a week to describing Hamas’s charter to kill Jews, its brutal treatment of Palestinians, its opposition to a two-state solution, and its use of human shields to deliberately increase civilian deaths to stir outrage against Israel. Israel did none of these things. Instead, it immediately began bombing Gaza. At a time when people unfamiliar with Hamas could have been learning its evil ways, they instead were confronted with images of destroyed buildings and heartbroken Palestinians.
Hamas started the war but did not force Israel to choose this war in this way.
7. Israel had no choice due to the need to restore deterrence.
This statement is central to Israel’s approach to the war. From what I can tell, it has gone relatively unquestioned by either Israel’s leadership or its people. Given the shock and trauma of October 7, this is not surprising. The massacre was horrifying. Hamas caught Israel unprepared. And the sheer act of over a thousand people being butchered, tortured, raped, and murdered without defense represented the very experience Israel was founded (among other things) to prevent.
So it makes sense that Israelis across the board would do everything in their power to avoid such a disaster ever happening again. One word they use to describe this is “deterrence.” It’s founded on two assumptions: first, that Iran, Hezbollah, and other enemies of Israel interpreted October 7 as a sign that Israel was far more vulnerable than it seemed. In other words, that October 7 reduced deterrence. Second, that the specific war Israel is now undertaking — massive bombings and a siege followed by a full ground invasion — is necessary to restore this deterrence.
The first assumption makes sense up to a degree. October 7 did reveal Israel’s vulnerabilities. It showed that Israel’s leaders were complacent about the threat from Hamas, lax about border security, more interested in protecting West Bank settlers than Israelis living outside Gaza, and so committed to preventing a Palestinian state that they were willing to make a devil’s bargain with Hamas for many years. If you’re the Supreme Leader of Iran or the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, you might look at October 7 and conclude that Israel is not as formidable as you thought.
On the other hand, if you were one of these leaders, you might also expect that whatever else Israel did, it would correct its security mistakes three or four times over, making it far less vulnerable to attack. You might also recognize the extraordinary power of Israel’s air force to retaliate — a power Israel was certain to have regardless of how it chose to respond to October 7. And if Israel’s leaders made a more measured response to October 7 and rationalized it by the need to preserve bombs and missiles for its larger enemies, you might believe them.
But, even if we were to overlook these points and assume that Israel lost deterrence on October 7, a few questions are still worth asking. Did restoring deterrence require the specific approach that Israel took to this war? Did it require the massive bombings, the siege, and the full ground invasion? Or could a different approach, one focused on special forces and targeted assassinations and employing surprise and subterfuge, have been just as, if not more, effective?
The benefit of seeing reality clearly
What troubles me the most about these seven ideas isn’t that they are ungrounded assessments. What troubles me the most is that so much of the public debate is centered on them. This keeps us from wrestling with the moral, political, and military questions from which a resolution to this conflict, or at least a better future than exists today, would emerge. Why not give such wrestling a shot?
Brief response to comments
I’m pleased that this piece generated so much engagement as evidenced by the number of comments. What surprised me is how many people have called me an apologist for genocide and/or war crimes.
Here’s why I’m surprised: On November 9 I wrote an essay advocating for Israel to take a counterterrorism approach rather than massive bombings and full ground invasion. I reinforced that point in items 6 and 7 of this essay. I also wrote very explicitly above that if Israel is committing war crimes, it should stop the crimes (but not the war).
Yet it appears that my critics either overlooked these points or, more likely, aren’t satisfied by them. They have a higher standard for me. To them, it’s not enough that I’ve argued for a counterterrorism approach instead of massive bombings and full ground invasion. They want me to use the word “genocide” to describe Israel’s actions. Anything that falls short of this standard renders me an apologist and propagandist.
Let me say this again. People are calling me an apologist for a set of actions that I don’t support because I object to calling them “genocide.”
On a positive note, one reader who thinks Israel is committing genocide (an assessment I don’t share) nonetheless expressed support for Israel switching to a counterterrorism strategy rather than simply allowing Hamas to have its way. I say “nonetheless” not because this stance is inconsistent (it’s not), but because it’s rare. Few people condemning Israel acknowledge it’s right and duty to defend itself from another October 7. This reader implicitly acknowledged this.
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